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REPLY
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KROTOSZYNSKI
Steven H. Shiffrnt
In his review' of my book, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of
America,2 RonaldJ. Krotoszynski, Jr. recognizes that I would afford spe-
cial protection for dissent, and that my definition of dissent would
include "disempowered cultural minorities who are victimized by the
hierarchy and racism of the contemporary United States."3 He insists,
however, that "right-wing" or corporate speech would be excluded
from my understanding of dissent.4 At one point, he goes so far as to
claim that my approach "has more in common with contemporary
free speech jurisprudence in the People's Republic of China than in
the United States."5
I would like to set the record straight. In the book I argue that
dissent should be given a pride of place in First Amendment theory
and special weight in a balancing process. 6 But I do not believe the
existence of dissent should be a necessary7 or a sufficient8 condition
t Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1 RonaldJ. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissen4 Fr e Speedra and the Continuing &archfor the "'Cen-
tral Meaning" of the FrstAmendmen 98 MicH. L REv. 1613 (2000) (book review). Professor
Krotoszynski also reviews STEPHEN L C.k.TER, THE Dwsmr oF mE GoVF.-mD: A Morr-
TION ON LAW, RELIGmON, AND LoYALTY (1998).
2 STEvvN H. SHwnuN, DMssEN, INJusicE, AND TH MwEnts OF A.wucA (1999).
3 Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1619.
4 1&. at 1632.
5 Rd. at 1621 (footnote omitted).
6 See, e.g., SHIunnN, supra note 2, at xi, 10, 91, 97, 117.
7 Krotoszynski blurs this position at various points in his review. He claims (often
wrongly) my position is that certain groups cannot engage in dissent or do not get the full
protection of the First Amendment. For exmmple, he attributes to me the %iew that corpo-
rate entities, such as tobacco companies, cannot engage in dissent even if they oppose the
views of either the government or the general community." Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at
1619. He claims I maintain that "no matter what the issue, commercial enterprises cannot
engage in dissent," id. at 1624, or that and-abortion protestors do not meet my dissent
model, id. at 1628. In fact, I believe that some speech of corporations is dissenting; some is
not. Some corporate speech should be protected (most commercial speech and most non-
commercial speech); some not (corporate campaign finance regulations should generally
be constitutional as should prohibitions of tobacco and alcoholic beverage advertising).
Anti-abortion protestors are dearly dissenters and should be protected whether or not
their speech is dissenting, in the absence of othenise unprotected conduct. Krotosynski
also imagines that I would not regard speakers who oppose affirmative action as dissenters,
id. at 1630, and he might be right about that, but I regard it as obvious that such speech
should be protected under the First Amendment. As I read his review, Krotoszynski glosses
over the point that to get protection speech need not be dissenting in uys that would
mislead even a careful reader.
8 Krotoszynski misses this point in parts of his review. See id. at 1616-17, 1633, 1635.
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for free speech protection.9 Thus, most religious, political, and com-
mercial speech should be protected whether or not dissenting. 10 De-
famatory lies about public figures are dissenting, but they should not
be protected."
I define dissent, not in terms of who speaks, but as "speech that
criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authori-
ties. 1 2 I do not now and never have believed that right-wing speech
or corporate speech are excluded from the definition of dissent. As I
say in the book
The overwhelming majority of right-wing dissent is fully protected
under my theory. The political bias of a dissent-centered concep-
tion of the First Amendment is for those who wish to challenge the
status quo and for those who believe that society stagnates and fur-
thers injustice when it is not open to challenge. People with these
beliefs sit at many points on the political spectrum. Those who wish
to preserve the status quo, of course, should oppose a dissent-cen-
tered theory (though their own speech remains protected in the
ovenvhelming majority of circumstances).' 3
In addition, I specifically observe that my approach "goes beyond the
protection of outsiders" and "also has.., special regard for the speech
of the powerful when it dissents from our existing customs, habits,
institutions, and authorities.'
4
To take a specific example, if a person or a powerful corporation
makes a defamatory statement about a public figure, the statement
would be protected unless it were a knowing falsehood. It would never
occur to me to permit a court to make ad hoc judgments within the
category as to whether the speech is or is not dissenting, is or is not
right-wing, is or is not the speech of a corporation. Similarly, it would
never occur to me to permit a court to examine the content of a pro-
testor's speech in applying rules regarding the time, place, or the
manner of speech. Those rules should be crafted to protect dissent
and enforced whether or not ajudge would determine that particular
speech falling under the rules is or is not dissent. Indeed, I specifi-
cally reject the idea that courts should be able to make ad hoc judg-
ments within categories when I discuss commercial advertising.' 5
Although there are hard cases for my approach, I am comforted
that almost all of the traditional areas of First Amendment discussion
9 SHIFFi'N, supra note 2, at xi-xii.
10 id. at xi-xiii.
11 Id atxi.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 129 (footnote omitted).
14 Id. at 76.
15 Id. at 41. If I were to permit ad hocjudgments, it would to be to allow determina-
tions that dissent exists, not the other way around.
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do not present hard cases concerning the existence of dissent or not.
Advocacy of illegal action, defamation of public figures, criticism of
employers in the workplace, access to public places and the media,
and the like are easy cases. Most such speech is dissenting, and rules
should be framed accordingly to encourage and protect dissent. On
the other hand, most commercial advertising and most speech expos-
ing embarassing details of a private person's sex life are not dissent-
ing, and rules should be crafted without the kind of special weight
afforded to dissenting speech.
Tobacco advertising and hate speech are hard cases however, and
that is why I devote two chapters to them. Although I do not explicitly
argue this in the book, a court might well resolve such issues without
exploring the presence of dissent if its presence would make no differ-
ence to the outcome. Whether or not tobacco advertising is assigned
full dissenting value, in my view, it should not be protected because of
the harm it causes. Conversely, in my view, general racist speech
should be protected whether or not it is dissenting in character be-
cause enforcement of a hate speech statute would aggravate the prob-
lem of racism. Nonetheless, I do argue that neither tobacco
advertising nor hate speech should be assigned full dissenting value.
It would be one thing if Professor Krotoszynski merely argued that I
could not consistently take these positions and protect right-wing
speech or corporate speech. In fact, I think he has quite a good argu-
ment about an aspect of the position I took on tobacco advertising,1 6
and the arguments he makes about my position on racist speech 17 are
well within the grounds of fair debate. But, to claim that I would ex-
clude corporate or right-wing speech from the category of dissent
grossly misrepresents my position.
I think it would be a good thing for academic life if a scholar
argued for the free speech positions taken by the People's Republic of
16 See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1620-21. Although I make dear that I do not
believe that ad hocjudgments should be made within the category of commercial advertis-
ing, Slmw'N, supra note 2, at 41, 1 go on to observe that tobacco advertising should not be
considered worthy of full dissenting value even if ad hocjudgments were made. Id. In the
course of that discussion I maintain that such advertising "is no part of a social practice
that challenges unjust hierarchies with the prospect of promoting progressive change." Id.
at 42. I believe this to be true. Moreover, I believe that a major advantage of protecting
dissent is that such protection offers the best hope of combating injustice. I do not believe,
however, that reactionary dissent should be unprotected in the absence of countevailing
harm, nor do I believe thatjudges should make ad hoc decisions about the progressive or
nonprogressive character of dissent. In my discussion of commercial advertising, I did not
mean to suggest othenvise-though I understand how readers might be misled. On the
other hand, to suppose that I intended such general ad hocjudgments when I had rejected
the possibility of any ad hoc determinations even within the category of commercial adver-
tising overlooks too much.
17 See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 1623-25, 1640-31, 1633-35.
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China. But, if Professor Krotoszynski is on the lookout for such a
scholar, he needs to look elsewhere.
